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Abstract
Background&Objectives The Implicit Relational Assessment
Procedure (IRAP) is a widely used measure of implicit cogni-
tion which has detected biases pertaining to various psycho-
logical constructs from spider fear to cocaine dependence. One
issue which emerges in the IRAP literature is that of partici-
pants failing to meet or uphold the necessary criteria to com-
plete the IRAP, which results in their elimination from the
study, which can be rather detrimental to results. The present
study sought to delineate which factors may contribute to high
attrition rates in IRAP research.
Methodology A previously used IRAP measuring spider fear
was employed along with an n-back task and a series of
questionnaires.
Results Results indicated that the ability to inhibit prepotent
responses and focus attention on the task at hand was the best
predictor of accuracy on the IRAP, irrespective of spider fear
or current levels of anxiety.
Conclusions These results are promising for the use of the IRAP
in clinically-relevant domains as they suggest that the psychopa-
thology of participants does not affect performance on the IRAP.
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-
Holmes et al. 2006) is a widely used measure of so-called
implicit cognition. It is a computer-based latency-focused mea-
sure which requires participants to respond quickly and accu-
rately to sets of stimuli in a way that is consistent or inconsistent
with their previously established responses biases (Barnes-
Holmes et al. 2010a). The IRAP was derived from a behavior-
analytic account of language and cognition called Relational
Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes et al. 2001). The fundamental
assumption of RFT is that the fundamental components of
human language and cognition are relational, and, thus, the
IRAP focuses on assessing relations between stimuli (e.g.,
Hughes et al. 2011). The basic hypothesis of the IRAP is that
average response latencies for a group should be shorter across
blocks deemed to be consistent relative to inconsistent trials
(Barnes-Holmes et al. 2010a), with the assumption that the
degree to which the consistent trials differ from the inconsistent
trials provides an index of the strength of the verbal or relational
responses being assessed (Barnes-Holmes et al. 2010a, b).
Numerous studies have been carried out which demon-
strate the basic IRAP effect that participants will respond
faster on trials that are consistent with their previously
established verbal relations than those that are inconsistent.
An account of this effect has been offered in the form of the
Relational Elaboration and Coherence Model (REC; Barnes-
Holmes et al. 2010a) which posits that particular IRAP trials
produce brief and immediate relational responses (BIRR’s)
before the participant presses a response key. The likelihood
of these BIRR’s occurring will be determined by the verbal
history of the participant and current contextual variables.
These studies encompass a wide variety of domains including
those that are relevant to the assessment of psychopathology,
socially sensitive topics such as race and issues around meth-
odology. The IRAP has successfully detected spider fear
(Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes 2012a), attitudes toward meat
and vegetables exhibited by meat-eaters and vegetarians
(Barnes-Holmes et al. 2010b), self-esteem (Vahey et al.
2009), disgust in relation to obsessive-compulsive tendencies
(Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes 2012b), cocaine dependence
(Carpenter et al. 2012), sexual attraction to children among
sexual offenders (Dawson et al. 2009) and depression (Hussey
and Barnes-Holmes 2012). Critically, it appears that the IRAP
effect is not subject to change by motivational forces such as
societal pressures and explicit instructions. For instance, white
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individuals demonstrated pro-white attitudes which were in-
congruent with their explicit attitudes (Barnes-Holmes et al.
2010a). In addition, even when explicitly instructed on how to
fake an IRAP, participants failed to conceal their established
verbal relations (McKenna et al. 2007).
The IRAP program requires participants to complete up to
three pairs of practice blocks in order to proceed to the fixed set
of six test blocks. In these practice blocks, participants must
reach the set criteria for that IRAP on a consecutive pair of
blocks (e.g., 80 % accuracy and 2000 ms response latency).
One critical issue that often arises in IRAP research is the
problem of participants failing to achieve the latency and/or
accuracy criteria on the practice blocks, or participants failing
to maintain the criteria throughout the six test blocks. When
this occurs, the participants’ dataset is often removed from the
entire experiment. An examination of the IRAP literature
shows that studies on average lose approximately 15–22 %
of participants through failure to meet or retain criteria. Some
studies have seen drop-out rates of up to 50 % due to this
problem. Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of participant
attrition is likely due to instructional issues in that it appears
that experimenterswithmore experience using the IRAP report
far lower attrition rates (i.e., around 10 %) than those with less
experience. A casual review of the IRAP literature indicates
that the majority of studies lose participants due to a drop in
accuracy rates rather than issues surrounding response latency.
One problem that emerges with participant attrition, of
course, is that those participants who fail to meet or maintain
the required performance criteria may do so due to reactions to
the very stimulus domain that is being targeted in the research.
For instance, Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes (2012a) reported
that in an IRAP designed to measure spider fear, four partic-
ipants from the high-fear spider group were removed from the
final analysis compared to one from the low-fear group due to
a failure to uphold the accuracy criteria. While the aforemen-
tioned study yielded positive results, it is possible that results
may be skewed toward the non-fearful if one group of partic-
ipants yields higher levels of attrition relative to another.
Occurrences such as this in IRAP research could reduce the
likelihood of obtaining a thorough picture of responding in the
domain under scrutiny, ultimately masking important results.
It is possible that the anxiety elicited by the pictures of spiders
used in the study (in particular in the high fear participants)
resulted in impaired performance on the IRAP. Gerdes et al.
(2008) reported a similar effect which suggests that spider
phobic individuals fail to disengage their attention from spider
stimuli in a reaction time task. Individuals with
contamination-based OCD also demonstrated an inability to
disengage from fearful and disgusting stimuli on a reaction
time task (Cisler and Olatunji 2010). In relation to the IRAP, it
is unclear whether salient stimuli cause the participants’ atten-
tion to be diverted from the purpose of the task resulting in a
greater number of errors or longer response latencies on
specific trials only or if this lapse of attention filters through-
out the rest of the task also. A theory known as Attentional
Control Theory posits that anxiety results in impaired atten-
tional control, which causes poorer performance in tasks
which involve working memory, specifically the central exec-
utive.1 (Coombes et al. 2009). Due to the seemingly
attentionally demanding nature of the IRAP, this theory may
offer a possible reason for the high attrition rates in IRAP
research.
Attentional Control Theory (ACT) was put forth by
Eysenck et al. (2007) to explicate the effects of anxiety on
cognitive performance. The two main functions within ACT
have been identified as the Inhibition function which is the
ability to purposefully inhibit prepotent processes when need-
ed and focus on relevant ones; and the Shifting function which
is the ability to shift between multiple tasks and mental sets
(Miyake et al. 2000; Eysenck et al. 2007). ACT posits that
anxiety causes an increase in the salience of the stimulus-
driven attentional system and a decrease in the goal-oriented
system (Eysenck et al. 2007). Anxiety causes worry about
threat to a current goal and anxious individuals come up with
strategies to counteract this worry in order to achieve their
goal (Eysenck et al. 2007; Derakshan and Eysenck 2009).
This could be applicable to the IRAP as participants need to
inhibit or disengage from the emotionally-relevant stimuli or
from their covert responses to the stimuli (stimulus-driven)
and focus on the task at hand (goal-oriented). An inability to
do this may result in a greater number of errors and/or slower
speed of responding.
Attentionally demanding tasks, such as the IRAP, likely
implement the central executive of working memory, and, as a
result, performance may be negatively affected by current
levels of anxiety. If highly distracting stimuli are presented
(e.g., pictures of spiders for spider-fearful individuals) they
may, thus, impact on the inhibition and shifting functions of
attentional control (Lavie et al. 2004; Eysenck and Derakshan
2011). Evidence supporting this claim has found that high-
anxious individuals have a greater propensity for distraction
than low-anxious individuals (Pacheco-Ungietti et al. 2010).
Insofar as the IRAP is demanding on the central executive,
and anxiety can impair cognitive performance, it stands to
reason that high-anxious individuals doing an IRAP designed
to measure anxiety, and its related constructs, may struggle to
maintain the necessary accuracy or latency criteria. On bal-
ance, high-anxious and low-anxious individuals may demon-
strate comparable performances if high-anxious individuals
attempt to compensate for performance deficiencies by
expending more effort (in the form of greater attentional
1 We acknowledge that by using cognitive terms such as central executive
and working memory we are drawing from two separate literatures,
however, these terms are ill-defined in behavioral psychology and are
the accepted terms in the field of cognitive psychology. Thus, we simply
use them here because they are used to investigate the variable of interest.
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control) than low-anxious individuals (Eysenck et al. 2007).
As an aside, it should be noted that IRAPs that do not use
anxiety-provoking stimuli sometimes still report high attrition
rates, and, thus, it is unclear if the task itself elicits anxiety
which in turn affects performance or if there is another vari-
able which is detrimental to performance.
The current study sought to determine the circumstances
under which participants will fail to uphold criteria on the
IRAP and if there are any predictive variables that can prevent
this from happening. The spider fear IRAP used in Nicholson
and Barnes-Holmes (2012a) was employed along with a series
of questionnaires such as the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire
(FSQ), State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory (STAI) and the
Attentional Control Scale (ACS) and a Behavioral Approach
Task (BAT) with a live tarantula. Additionally, a symbol
version of the n-back task, which is assumed to place great
demands on working memory and attention because it in-
volves updating, monitoring and manipulating previously re-
membered information (Chen et al. 2008; Owen et al. 2005),
was implemented to determine if performance on an
attentionally demanding task is predictive of IRAP per-
formance. The present study was different from previous
IRAP studies as it did not make use of the D-IRAP scores
as the purpose was not to measure spider fear but to
determine the variables which predict response latency
and accuracy of the IRAP. As such, raw response laten-
cies to specific stimuli and accuracy were the results of
interest for this study. It was hypothesized that perfor-
mance deficits on the n-back would be comparable to
those on the IRAP. Based on the attentional control liter-
ature, it was also hypothesized that scores on the ACS and
its sub-components as well as the FSQ and the STAI
would be related to accuracy on both tasks. Finally, evi-
dence from the literature suggests that high-anxious indi-
viduals have difficulty disengaging from threatening stim-
uli (Koster et al. 2004), thus, it was assumed that high
fear participants would produce longer response latencies
on the IRAP than low fear participants.
Method
Participants
A random sample of 32 undergraduate students from the
National University of Ireland, Maynooth volunteered to take
part in the current study. Informed consent was obtained from
each participant prior to them taking part in the experiment.
The sample consisted of 18 women and 14 men, who had a
mean age of 21.3 years. There were no exclusion criteria
implemented for the study. Each participant completed the




A live tarantula (Brazilian Black) was used throughout the
study. It measured approximately 11 cm and was a pet of a
member of staff in the Department of Psychology at NUI
Maynooth. The tarantula was confined to a plastic terrarium
for the duration of the experimental process.
Fear of Spider Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski
and O’Donohue 1995)
The FSQ is a self-report scale consisting of 18 items that
measures spider fear (e.g., “If I saw a spider now, I would
think it would harm me”). Szymanski and O’Donohue (1995)
found that phobic and non-phobic individuals yield signifi-
cantly different scores on the FSQ based on data obtained
from 338 undergraduate students. The FSQ has high test–
retest reliability (.97) and a split-half reliability coefficient of
.89, along with high internal consistency, Cronbach’s al-
pha= .92 in a non-clinical sample (Szymanski and
O’Donohue 1995). Internal consistency for the present sample
was excellent, Cronbach’s Alpha=.96.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Form Y-1 (STAI; Spielberger
et al. 1983)
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Form Y-1 is a 20 item self-
report subscale of the STAI designed to measure state anxiety,
i.e., how an individual is feeling right now (e.g., “I feel calm”).
Each item is rated on a 5-point (0–4) Likert scale of the level
of present anxiety. This subscale of the STAI has been found
to have excellent internal consistency among college students,
Cronbach’s alpha=.90-.91 (Spielberger et al. 1983). Internal
consistency for the present sample was excellent, Cronbach’s
Alpha=.89.
Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry and Reed 2002)
The ACS is a self report measure of attentional control, which
tests two attentional functions; the inhibition function (the
ability to maintain attention for a current task regardless of
distracters; e.g., “When I am working hard on something, I
still get distracted by events around me”) and the shifting
function (the ability to switch focus between multiple tasks;
e.g., “After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily shift
my attention back to what I was doing before”). The ques-
tionnaire is composed of 20 items. Individuals are asked to
rate their personal response to each item on a 4 point Likert
scale (1=almost never, 4=always). A total ACS score indi-
cates the individual’s ability to control his or her attention.
Ólafsson et al. (2011) reported internal consistency for the
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total score and inhibition function as good (Cronbach’s
Alpha=.84 and .,82 respectively). In addition, the shifting
function was found to have a lower but still adequate level
of internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha=.68). Internal con-
sistency for the present sample for the overall score was
acceptable, Cronbach’s Alpha=.72, and was also acceptable
for the inhibition subscale (Cronbach’s Alpha=.72), however,
internal consistency was poor for the shifting function sub-
scale (Cronbach’s Alpha=.62).
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure
(IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al. 2006)
The IRAP used during the current study was the same IRAP
used in Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes (2012a). Each trial
contained either a fear type label (“Frightens Me”, “Disgusts
Me”, “Scares Me”, “Creeps Me Out”) or an approach type
label (“I Could Approach”, “I May Approach”, “I Can
Approach”, “I Will Approach”). Simultaneously one of eight
target stimuli was presented, which consisted of four color
pictures of spiders and four color pictures of landscapes. The
pleasant stimuli (i.e., landscapes) were taken from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al.
1996) and the spider images were those used by Huijding
and de Jong (2007). In addition, two response options “True”
and “False” were displayed on the screen. All stimuli
remained present on the screen until a response key was
pressed (See Fig. 1). If a response key was not pressed within
the time allowed (e.g., 2000 ms) the words “Too Slow”
appeared on the screen to prompt the participant for an answer.
If an incorrect response was given a red “X” appeared on the
screen, which remained there until the correct response was
made. The IRAP program insured that all eight picture stimuli
and all eight word stimuli were presented twice within each
block of trials. In addition, the trials were presented
quasirandomly, with the constraint that each of the four trial
types appeared eight times within each 32-trial block. The
program also ensured that the same trial type was not present-
ed across successive trials. Finally, the left–right positioning
of the two response options (“True” and “False”) alternated
randomly across trials with the constraint that they could not
appear in the same positions across four successive trials.
Participants completed up to six practice and six test
blocks, with each block consisting of 32 trials. Correct re-
sponses were dependant on whether the block was termed
consistent or inconsistent. Consistent blocks were defined as
those that required responses that were in accordance with the
beliefs of spider phobic individuals (e.g., selecting “True”
when presented with “Frightens Me” and a spider image;
selecting “False” when presented with “I Can Approach”
and an image of a spider). Inconsistent blocks were defined
as those counter to the beliefs of spider phobics (e.g., selecting
“False” when presented with “Frightens Me” and a picture of
a spider; selecting “True” when presented with “I Can
Approach” and an image of a spider). Participants were told
that the IRAP would begin with a consistent block and would
alternate between the two block types across the remaining
blocks. Participants were informed that, between the
Fig. 1 Examples of the four trial-
types in the IRAP. Note. The
boxed words (“Consistent” and
“Inconsistent”) and the arrows did
not appear on screen for
participants
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completion of one block and prior to the commencement of
another, that all the previous correct answers were now incor-
rect and vice-versa. Finally, participants were made aware
that, at times, they would be required to respond in a manner
that was consistent with their own beliefs and, at other times,
in a manner that was inconsistent with their beliefs.
n-back task
The n-back (Gevins and Cutillo 1993) was used as a cognitive
task to act as a comparison to the IRAP. The task requires
participants to monitor a series of stimuli and to determine on
each trial which stimulus was presented n trials previously,
where n is a pre-specified number (Owen et al. 2005). The n-
back used in the present study had a 2-back memory load and
four stimulus types could be presented. A rectangle was pre-
sented on the screen to each participant, in which one of four
symbols (e.g., an asterisk, a square, a triangle or a spider symbol)
appeared. They were informed that each symbol corresponded
to a key on the keyboard (1= , 2=▲ , 3= , 4=■ ), which were
not marked on the keyboard. Each stimulus was presented for
two seconds with only one symbol being presented at any one
time. The stimuli changed regardless of the participant’s re-
sponse or non-response. A fixation cross lasting 500 ms ap-
peared in between each trial. A response was given by pressing
the correct key, with keys 1–4 (on a standard keyboard) corre-
sponding to one of the four stimuli. Each participant was in-
formed that their task was to watch the sequence of symbols and
to correctly identify the symbol that appeared two symbols
before the present one on screen. That is, if the first two trials
presented a square followed by a spider and the third trial
presented an asterisk, the correct response key to press when
the asterisk appeared was the key for the square. Blank trials
were presented in pairs throughout the test as a reset. The n-back
was run using E-prime (Schneider et al. 2002), which adminis-
tered instructions, stimuli and recorded responses. Each partic-
ipant completed a practice block of 12 trials and then a test block
of 77 trials.
Behavioral Approach Task (BAT; adapted from Nicholson
and Barnes-Holmes 2012a)
Participants were informed that an adjoining room held a live
spider in it. They were subsequently asked to approach the
spider, which was contained in a terrarium, and were allocated
a rating between 0–6, depending on how close they came to
the spider (0=not allowing the experimenter to open the door,
1=allowing the experimenter to open the door, 2=walking
into the room but staying by the door, 3=walking up to the
terrarium and standing beside it, 4=touching the terrarium, 5=
experimenter lifts up the terrarium and the participant places
their hand underneath where the spider is situated and 6=the
participant holds their hand underneath the terrarium for a full
minute). Each participant was awarded a score that reflected
how many steps they completed successfully (i.e., 1 for com-
pleting step 1, 2 for completing step 2, and so on up to a
maximum score of 6).
Mental Effort Scale (Paas 1992)
The perceived amount of mental effort expended by each
participant during the IRAP and during the n-back was re-
corded with the use of a 1 item self report scale. The amount of
effort used corresponded to a numerical value between 1–9,
1=“very little mental effort” and 9=“very high mental effort”.
The current scale was based on one used by Paas (1992),
which has been found to yield a satisfactory reliability coeffi-
cient (Cronbach’s Alpha .90).
General Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaires first in the order of
STAI, FSQ and ACS. The STAI was completed first to mea-
sure state anxiety at the beginning of the experiment.
Participants then completed the IRAP, the n-back task and
the BAT with the order in which the participants completed
each task being counterbalanced. The instructions for both the
IRAP task and the n-back task were presented on paper and
were read through with the experimenter to ensure the partic-
ipant knew what was being asked of them. Participants com-
pleted the Mental Effort Scales after both the IRAP and the n-
back. Finally, at the end of the experiment, participants com-
pleted an STAI.
Data Analytic Strategy
The purpose of the study was to determine the factors which
effect accuracy and response latency on the IRAP, and, thus,
all analyses were performed using response latencies from
each of the stimuli used in the IRAP and n-back tasks along
with the number or percentage of correct responses.
Additionally, the analyses from the questionnaires and perfor-
mance on the BAT were also included. Due to the primary
focus of the study, the D-IRAP scores were not analyzed.
Pearson product–moment correlations were computed to ex-
amine the relationships between the variables. There were no
formal procedures implemented to correct for multiple testing
due to the small sample size in an effort to avoid making a type
1 error (the actual p values for the correlations are included
with the r values to indicate actual levels of significance).
Hierarchical multiple regressions were used to determine
the factors which predict IRAP performance while con-
trolling for other variables (e.g., pre-experimental anxi-
ety and spider fear).
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Results
Scoring the IRAP
The IRAP data contains response latencies and accuracy for
each participant, which is central to the scoring process.
Typically, these two variables are used to screen out partici-
pants by removing those individuals who fail to maintain
specific latency and accuracy criteria across the test blocks.
Given that the purpose of the current study was to determine if
fear-inducing stimuli and anxiety levels impact on the very
variables that are typically used to screen out participants, it
would be inappropriate to remove those participants in the
present research. Three participants, thus, remained within the
final sample that would otherwise have been removed (one
participant failed to complete the practice blocks and thereby
failing to provide any data for analysis). Finally, also due to
the focus of the study, both average response latencies and
average response accuracy across all of the test blocks for each
participant, for the spider and pleasant trial-types, provided the
primary data (i.e., the data were not divided into fear “consis-
tent” versus fear “inconsistent” test blocks or transformed into
D-IRAP scores). Table 1 contains mean values and standard
deviations for all measures.
Explicit/Behavioral Correlations
A correlation matrix was calculated to examine the relation-
ships between the self-report measures (questionnaires and the
Mental Effort sales) and avoidance behavior as measured by
the BAT (See Table 2). It revealed that pre-experimental
anxiety was positively related to spider fear; also there was a
significant negative correlation between approach behavior
and self-reported attentional control. Finally, self-reported
spider fear and post-experimental anxiety were negatively
related to performance on the BAT. In summary, less avoid-
ance behavior was associated with low spider fear and low
levels of state anxiety at the end of the experiment.
Interestingly, greater avoidance behavior was related to higher
levels of self-reported attentional control suggesting that the
spider fearful individuals believed they had good attentional
control.
Predicting Accuracy and Response Latency on the IRAP
Correlational Analysis
The second set of analyses sought to determine if performance
on the IRAP and n-back tasks (including accuracy and re-
sponse latencies on each stimulus) was predicted by spider
fear (as measured by the FSQ) avoidance behavior, attentional
control and its two constituents (as measured by the ACS),
anxiety level at both pre-experimental and post-experimental
sequence (as measured by the STAI) or mental effort (as
measured by the Mental Effort Scale, with respect to the
IRAP and the n-back). Additionally, the analyses assessed
whether performance on a cognitively demanding task (as
measured by the n-back), would be predictive of performance
on the IRAP. The results of the correlational analyses are
presented in Table 3. IRAP accuracy correlated significantly
with the ACS (Inhibition) and accuracy on the n-back. These
results, thus, indicated that greater accuracy on the IRAP
predicted higher levels of inhibitory control and perhaps rather
predictably higher accuracy on another performance based
measure that required attentional control. Interestingly, accu-
racy on the n-back correlated negatively with the FSQ, indi-
cating that greater WM and attention predicted lower levels of
self-reported spider fear. Critically, the correlational analyses
indicate that neither accuracy nor response latency on the
IRAP was influenced significantly by the measures associated
with spider fear or anxiety. Thus, it seems unlikely that the
data for many participants are removed from IRAP studies
based on individual differences in these two domains.
Accuracy on the n-back was negatively related to response
latency on each of the four stimuli used suggesting that faster
responding was indicative of greater accuracy. Finally, there
were significant positive correlations between scores on the
FSQ and response latencies on the spider, star and triangle
stimuli along with significant negative correlations between
avoidance behavior and response latencies on the star and
triangle stimuli.
Regression Analyses
Three hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conduct-
ed to confirm that the Inhibition function predicted IRAP
Table 1 Means and standard deviations from all measures
Mean SD








IRAP Response Latency (ms) Spider 1339 345
Pleasant 1351 341
STAI Pre-Experiment 31.7 8.2
FSQ 28.8 26.5
ACS 48.1 7.1
STAI Post-Experiment 33.1 11.4
Note: STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; FSQ: Fear of Spiders Ques-
tionnaire; ACS: Attentional Control Scale
184 Psychol Rec (2014) 64:179–188
accuracy after controlling for the effects of pre-experimental
anxiety and spider fear (when polynomial regression analyses
were conducted, these yielded the same statistical conclusions
as those reported subsequently). The first hierarchical multiple
regression entered pre-experimental anxiety (pre-STAI) into
step 1 of the model, which accounted for 9.2 % of the vari-
ance, β=−.30, p=.09. The Inhibition function was then en-
tered as step 2 of the model and was shown to account for
12.8 % of the variance, β=.36, p=.04. The next regression
analysis, entered FSQ as step 1 in the model, and it accounted
for .6 % of the variance, β=.07, p=.67. Similarly, the
Inhibition function was entered as step 2 and accounted for
12.6% of the variance, β=.36, p=.05. In both cases, therefore,
Inhibition predicted IRAP accuracy independently of anxiety
and spider fear. A final hierarchical regression was completed
based on the correlation found between the FSQ and n-back
accuracy (see Table 1), which sought to confirm that n-back
accuracy was a stable predictor of IRAP accuracy regardless
of the effects of spider fear. As before, FSQ was entered as
step 1 into the model, accounting for .6 % of the variance,
β=.07, p=.68. The n-back accuracy was subsequently entered
as step 2 in the model and was found to account for 26.1 % of
variance, β=.58, p=.00, thus, confirming that n-back accura-
cy does indeed predict accuracy on the IRAP independently of
self-reported spider fear.
One final hierarchical multiple regression was carried out
to determine if scores on the FSQ could predict accuracy on
the n-back independently of pre-experimental state anxiety.
Anxiety (pre-STAI) was entered at step 1 of the model and
was a marginally significant predictor of accuracy on the n-
back accounting for 9 % of the variance, β=−.31, p=.08.
Scores on the FSQ were entered into step 2 of the model
accounting for an additional 23.4 % of the variance, β=−.4,
p=.02. Thus, the self-reported spider fear was a significant
Table 2 Pearson Product–moment correlations between the self-report measures and the BAT
STAI Pre FSQ ACS STAI Post BAT Mental Effort IRAP Mental Effort n-back
STAI Pre – .37* −.21 .16 −.20 −.1 −.07
FSQ – .16 .29 −.77** −.17 .28
ACS – .15 −.37* .03 .34*
STAI Post – -.35* .25 .33
BAT – .20 −.28
Mental Effort IRAP – −.03
Note: STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; FSQ: Fear of Spiders Questionnaire; ACS: Attentional Control Scale; BAT: Behavioral Approach Task
*p<.05
**p<.01
Table 3 Pearson Product–moment correlations between average IRAP
accuracy, IRAP response latencies (RL), n-back accuracy and n-back
response latencies (RL) with nine variables, the FSQ, the BAT , the
ACS (Inhibition and Shifting functions), n-back Accuracy, the STAI
(pre and post) and the Mental Effort Scales (IRAP and n-back)
IRAP n-back
Accuracy Spider RL Pleasant RL Accuracy Spider RL Square RL Star RL Triangle RL
FSQ .07 −.14 −.01 −.42** .45** .30 .56** .63***
BAT −.10 .14 .11 .29 −.34 −.23 −.44** −.41**
ACS Inhibition .36* −.27 −.28 .04 .07 −.06 .19 .05
Shifting .24 −.24 −.24 .07 −.08 −.10 .05 −.04
n-back Accuracy .42** −.07 −.12 − −.55** −.42* −.61*** −.67***
STAI Pre −.30 .21 .21 −.14 .20 .14 .29 .27
Post −.26 .16 .15 −.17 −.05 −.14 .02 .03
Mental Effort Scale IRAP −.29 .31 .32 −.07 −.22 −.15 −.26 −.21




Note: STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; FSQ: Fear of Spiders Questionnaire; ACS: Attentional Control Scale; RL: Response Latency
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predictor of accuracy on the n-back, independently of levels of
state anxiety.
Discussion
The main finding of the current study was that the inhibition
function of ACTwas a predictor of performance on the IRAP,
specifically in regards to accuracy. There was no relationship
between the components of attentional control (inhibition and
shifting) and performance on the n-back task. Factors such as
the relevance of the stimuli to the participant’s psychopathol-
ogy or anxiety did not appear to reduce accuracy on the IRAP;
however, spider fear was a predictor of accuracy on the n-
back. Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no variation in
response latencies between participants who scored higher on
the FSQ on the spider trial-types. Finally, accuracy on the n-
back task was a significant predictor of accuracy on the IRAP.
The results are promising regarding the use of the IRAP in
clinically relevant domains as it appears that the salience of the
stimuli to the psychopathology of the participant did not affect
performance on the IRAP. Critically, following an examina-
tion of response latencies of both the spider and pleasant trial-
types in the correlation analyses, it did not appear that the
higher fear participants produced longer response latencies on
the spider trial-types suggesting that they did not struggle to
disengage from the spider stimuli as hypothesized. Thus, the
results support the use of the IRAP in applied domains as they
suggest that clinical or high-anxious participants will not
struggle to maintain criteria across the IRAP, more so than a
non-clinical sample. It should be noted that the present study
was limited as it used a non-clinical student sample that scored
across a continuum from low to high fear on the self-report
measure. Thus, the high fear participants are only high scoring
in comparison to a non-clinical sample. Further research could
utilize a clinical sample of spider phobic individuals (or those
suffering with a different psychopathology) to determine if
there is an effect of the stimuli used in the IRAP in clinical
samples, however, the present results are promising.
Correlational analyses revealed that those who demonstrat-
ed greater avoidance behavior reported higher levels of spider
fear at the beginning of the experiment and greater state
anxiety at the conclusion of the experiment. This analysis also
produced an interesting finding which showed that those who
were highly avoidant on the BAT reported a greater propensity
for attentional control. This result conflicts with evidence
from the n-back task in which higher spider fear appeared to
result in a greater number of errors suggesting poorer atten-
tional control. It is possible that there were self-presentational
biases at work on the ACS or perhaps the high fear partici-
pants were merely unaware of their actual ability to control
their attentional resources. Nevertheless, it appears from the
present results that high spider fear can impair performance on
an attentionally demanding task (i.e., the n-back) in which
spider stimuli are presented. The current results are not the
first to show the effects of psychopathology on the n-back
task. For example, previous research found that depressed
patients demonstrated significant impairments in performance
on an n-back task compared to controls (Harvey et al. 2004).
Regarding response latency on the n-back, high levels of
spider fear were related to longer response latencies on the
spider, star and triangle stimuli. A possible explanation of this
effect could be due to having to respond to the other stimuli
while the spider is on the screen or having to respond to the
spider while the other stimuli were on the screen. Thus, there
is a greater interaction between the stimuli rather than on the
IRAP. Overall, this finding is consistent with Attentional
Control Theory as it posits that anxiety (likely evoked from
the spider stimuli) results in impaired attentional control on a
task such as the n-back that implements working memory
(Eysenck et al. 2007; Derakshan and Eysenck 2009).
The current findings suggest that differences in a specific
cognitive ability, the inhibition function, are responsible for
the participants’ ability to achieve and maintain performance
criteria across the test blocks of the IRAP. Normally, the D-
IRAP transformation controls, at least to some extent, for
differences in cognitive ability across participants, and ,thus
if the performance criteria are met and maintained, individual
differences in cognitive ability becomes largely irrelevant
during the final analysis. However, participants are typically
eliminated from studies before aD-score is calculated because
they do not maintain criteria across the test blocks. The current
findings suggest that the inhibition subscale of the ACS may
provide a way to screen participants to determine who may
need extra assistance in getting through the IRAP. Of course,
should participants be screened before completing the IRAP, it
is important to implement valid methodologies which will
assist them in achieving the necessary criteria.
The purpose of the inhibition function is to refrain from
attending to task-irrelevant stimuli and responses (Eysenck
and Derakshan 2011), and as mentioned previously, anxiety
impairs performance of the inhibition function (see Derakshan
and Eysenck 2009). Thus, it could be argued that anxiety has a
detrimental effect on the inhibition function, which results in a
greater number of mistakes made on the IRAP. However,
the source of this anxiety remains unclear. The present
results suggest that self-reported spider fear and pre-
experimental anxiety were not predictive of lower accu-
racy on the IRAP, however, the task itself may be
eliciting anxiety in the participants. Indeed, there was a
slight increase in state anxiety by the end of the experi-
ment. However, future research could further examine
the possibility that test anxiety adversely impacts IRAP
performance through the inhibition function as previous
research has found that test anxiety negatively effects
achievement (Hembree 1988).
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Previous research has utilized a practice IRAP to familiar-
ize participants with the task before doing the IRAP proper
(Vahey et al. 2010). One issue around this method is that a
practice IRAP can be time-consuming and more importantly
participants may be cognitively “tired” by the time the second
IRAP is presented, which could result in more errors. Insofar
as differences in attentional control appear to predict varia-
tions in accuracy, a method which improves this factor could
be highly beneficial. Some researchers have posited that
mindfulness, which is enhanced attentiveness and awareness
of present experience (Brown and Ryan 2003), possesses
many features of attentional control. Indeed, poor attentional
control is indicative of low levels of mindfulness (Baer et al.
2006; Walsh et al. 2009), thus, it is possible that implementing
a mindfulness task before completion of the IRAP may help
participants to avoid attending to task-irrelevant thoughts and
feelings that may arise while carrying out the IRAP. However,
further research is vital to determine the intricacies that would
be necessary in order for the mindfulness task to improve
attentional control in the relatively short duration of an
experiment.
One limitation of the current study is the relatively small
sample size, and, thus, the absence of statistically significant
effects might be due, in part, to insufficient power. Of course,
future studies that employ the IRAP in “pure” social or clinical
research that would be difficult and/or too costly to replicate
should employ larger samples to control for random statistical
aberrations. A second possible critique is the inclusion of
landscapes as the opposing category in the IRAP because
the concept “I could approach a landscape” may have been
confusing for participants. Spiders have always been a diffi-
cult category to use in the IRAP and other implicit measures
due to the lack of a natural opposite and this has been widely
documented in the literature (see Teachman 2007; Nicholson
and Barnes-Holmes 2012a). However, the use of other ani-
mals such as dogs or cats as opposing categories can also be
problematic; for instance, a picture of a puppy or a kitten may
be negatively valenced for some individuals due to specific
allergies to domestic pets.
It is worth noting that accuracy on the IRAP was positively
related to accuracy on the n-back task. That is, those that made
a greater number of errors in responding on the n-back also
made a higher number of errors on the IRAP. The n-back task
is a test of working memory and attention switching
(Sliwinski et al. 2006), which provides empirical evidence of
the assumption that working memory is required while carry-
ing out the IRAP. However, high levels of self-reported spider
fear (as measured by the FSQ) were related to a greater
number of errors on the n-back task, whereas self-reported
spider fear did not influence performance on the IRAP. Thus,
it appears that the cause of errors on the IRAP is different from
that of the n-back. Namely, the n-back may be more affected
by the relevance of the stimuli to the psychopathology of the
participant. This could also be due to procedural differences
between the tasks. For example, the IRAP employed in the
current study presented up to six thirty-two trial practice
blocks while the n-back presented a total of twelve practice
trials. Thus, the participants may have become desensitized to
the anxiety evoked by the spider pictures on the IRAP before
the test blocks, which resulted in less distraction whereas the
relatively limited practice for the n-backmay not have allowed
the fear to be extinguished before the test block. This result
suggests that not only are the practice blocks useful for famil-
iarizing participants with the IRAP task, they also may serve
as a way in which to extinguish internal responses which may
be detrimental to performance on the IRAP. Critically, how-
ever, any such desensitization effects do not appear to
undermine the validity of the IRAP as a measure because
previous IRAP research has demonstrated between-group
differences across a range of domains relevant to psy-
chopathology, including fear (Nicholson and Barnes-
Holmes 2012a), addiction (Carpenter et al. 2012), de-
pression (Hussey and Barnes-Holmes 2014) and disgust
(Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes 2012b).
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